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Cross-border M&As can trigger a higher international taxation of the 
target’s income. Non-resident dividend withholding taxes may be imposed 
by the target country, while additional corporate income taxation can be 
imposed by the acquiring country. Our evidence suggests that takeover 
premiums fully reflect non-resident dividend withholding taxes, while 
there is some evidence that they reflect corporate income taxation by the 
acquiring country as well. In contrast, acquiring firm stock market returns 
around the bid announcement do not appear to reflect either type of 
taxation. These results are consistent with previous findings that the gains 
of M&As primarily accrue to target shareholders. 
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1.  Introduction 
A cross-border takeover creates a new multinational firm with the target 
becoming a foreign subsidiary or branch and the acquirer becoming the parent firm. 
The creation of a new multinational firm through a takover may have important tax 
costs. Specifically, the new foreign subsidiary may have to pay non-resident 
withholding taxes on dividends distributed to the parent, while the parent may be 
liable to pay additional corporate income tax in the parent country on income received 
from the new foreign subsidiary. Additional corporate income tax levied by the parent 
country amounts to international double taxation of the new foreign subsidiary’s 
income. This paper examines how additional tax liabilities of this kind affect takeover 
premiums in international M&As as well as excess returns achieved by acquirers. 
 Among developed countries, non-resident dividend withholding taxes remain 
quite common. Only some OECD member countries, among them the United 
Kingdom and the United States, have completely or almost completely eliminated 
such taxation. At the same time, roughly half of the developed countries, including the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Japan, tax the worldwide corporate income of 
their resident multinationals, potentially giving rise to international double taxation of 
the target’s income.  
Additional taxation of the target’s income triggered by an international 
takeover clearly reduces the net-of-tax gains from the takeover to be shared between 
acquirer and target shareholders.  If target shareholders bear part of the additional 
international taxation, then this should be reflected in a lower takeover premium. 
Similarly, lower acquirer firm excess stock market returns around the announcement 
bid would suggest that acquirer firm shareholders effectively bear part of the 
additional taxation.  
This paper provides empirical evidence on the responsiveness of international 
takeover premiums and acquirer firm excess returns to the international taxation 
triggered by cross-border M&As. We consider both non-resident dividend 
withholding taxes in the target country and corporate income taxation in the acquirer 
country.  For this purpose, we have gathered detailed information on the international 
taxation of dividend flows among a set of European countries, Japan and the United 
States.  This information includes non-resident withholding tax rates, corporate tax 
rates and details of the double tax relief conventions applied by the countries in our 
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sample. We examine international M&As over the 1985-2004 period.  On average, 
these M&As create an additional tax burden of about 4 percent of the target’s net 
income.  
Our empirical results suggest that non-resident dividend withholding taxes are 
fully reflected in reduced international takeover premiums. In fact, in our benchmark 
regression the estimate of the coefficient measuring the ‘pass-through’ of non-resident 
withholding taxes into lower premiums is not statistically different from one. Hence, 
the incidence of non-resident dividend withholding taxes appears to be fully on target 
firm shareholders. In addition, there is evidence of a pass-through of corporate income 
taxes into lower takeover premiums for deals involving manufacturing firms, even if 
the pass-through is somewhat weaker than in the case of non-resident withholding 
taxes. In contrast, we find no evidence that either non-resident withholding taxes or 
corporate taxes are systematically reflected in lower acquiring firm announcement 
returns.  
The finding that takeover premiums and not acquirer firm announcement 
returns are systematically affected by the additional international tax burdens suggest 
that the incidence of the additional taxation rests with target firm shareholders and not 
acquiring firm shareholders. This outcome is consistent with previous research 
indicating that any gains from (domestic) M&As tend to accrue mainly to target 
shareholders. Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001), for instance, report that targets 
experience a highly significant positive average abnormal returns of 20.1 percent over 
a three day window around the announcement date in case of cash-financed 
acquisitions. Acquirer shareholders, instead, have a statistically insignificant average 
abnormal return of 0.4 percent in this instance.2   
There are several potential explanations for the result that non-resident 
dividend withholding taxes are more clearly discounted into lower international 
takeover premiums than parent country corporate income taxes. First, multinationals 
resident in some countries are allowed to engage in worldwide income averaging. 
This enables these multinationals to claim a foreign tax credit for the taxes paid in 
high-tax countries against the tax due on the multinational’s income in low-tax 
countries. Second, calculated double tax liabilities may be too large, if firms rationally 
expect a reduction in future parent country taxes at the moment of profit repatriation. 
                                                 
2 See also Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988) for early surveys. 
 4
U.S. multinationals, for instance, may expect future reductions in the tax on 
repatriated earnings on the basis of their experience with the American Jobs Creation 
Act of 2004. This legislation temporarily allowed U.S. multinationals to repatriate 
profits subject to a low flat tax rate of 5.25 percent until the end of 2005.  
As indicated, our international tax variables are based on tax rates and on other 
institutional details of the international tax system. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
coefficients measuring the pass-through of our constructed international tax burden 
variables into lower takeover premiums are in some specifications estimated to be 
statistically larger than one. This could reflect that the expected average tax rate (i.e., 
the expected tax payment divided by the expected taxable income) can exceed the 
statutory tax rate, if there is imperfect off-setting of losses against positive taxable 
income in other years or areas. Within multinational firms, there certainly tends to be 
limited, if any, offset of a foreign subsidiary’s losses against any taxable income 
within the parent country. Consistent with an imperfect loss-offset explanation, we 
find that the pass-through of international taxation into lower takeover premiums is 
relatively pronounced for firms that are prone to suffer losses.  
 Ayers, Craig, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2003) have previously shown that 
personal-level capital gains taxation on selling shareholders positively affects 
takeover premiums for domestic U.S. deals. Specifically, the takeover premium is 
positively related to the personal capital gains tax rate in the U.S., and negatively to 
the share of exempt institutional ownership. Ayers et al. (2003) essentially find a 
capital gains tax effect on takeover premiums, because an acquisition brings already 
overhanging capital gains taxation forward. This paper differs from Ayers et al. 
(2003) in three important respects. First, we consider business-level dividend taxation 
on the buyer side rather than personal-level capital gains taxation on the seller side. 
This explains that we find a negative rather than positive effect of taxation on 
takeover premiums. Second, the additional dividend taxation triggered by a cross-
border takeover can be taken to be unexpected, as cross-border takeovers from a 
particular country are imperfectly anticipated events.  Thus, we consider the pricing 
effect of the imposition ‘new’ taxation, rather than the bringing forward of already 
existing taxation. Third, we know the exact identity of the buying firm, and hence can 
estimate a pricing effect of dividend taxation using detailed information on dividend 
taxation regimes applicable across the various international transactions. The present 
paper contributes to an existing literature on the capitalization effects of dividend 
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taxation on share prices, including Harris, Hubbard and Kemsley (2001) and Gentry, 
Kemsley and Mayer (2003), that similarly lacks exact information on asset ownership 
that could identify the appropriate tax regime.     
There has been a considerable literature on how firm and deal characteristics 
affect takeover premiums and abnormal returns of acquiring and target firms around 
the announcement date. Servaes (1991) shows that target, bidder and total returns are 
larger when targets have low q ratios and bidders have high q ratios. Dong, 
Hirshleifer, Richardson and Teoh (2006) construct measures of acquiring and firm 
overvaluation, such as the price-to-book ratio, and relate these to deal characteristics 
such or the means of payment and the bid premium. They find that a higher acquiring 
firm price-to-book ratio is related to a higher bid premium, while a higher target firm 
price-to-book ratio is related to a lower bid premium. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find 
that low book-to-value acquiring firms have a relatively poor long-term performance 
after mergers. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) show that low-book-to-market 
firms have made relatively many large loss deals in the 1998-2001 period. Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) further find that the announcement return is higher for 
small acquirers. Stock finance appears to create relatively small (negative) returns for 
acquirers (see, for instance, Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001)). Bates and 
Lemmon (2003) and Officer (2003) consider the impact of termination fees on merger 
outcomes, while Comment and Schwert (1995), Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997) 
and Moeller (2005) examine anti-takeover measures such as poison pills, independent 
directors and indices of shareholder control, respectively. Based on this literature, we 
select several firm and deal characteristics as controls in our premium regressions.      
 Several papers have previously considered how international double taxation 
affects the volume and direction of foreign direct investment and M&As. Hines 
(1996) finds that countries with worldwide taxation invest relatively much in U.S. 
states with high corporate income taxes. This reflects that U.S. state taxes are 
generally creditable against corporate income taxes in countries with worldwide 
taxation. Di Giovanni (2005) finds that a country’s real gross M&A inflows are 
negatively related to its average corporate tax rate. Desai and Hines (2002) examine 
the role of international double taxation in 26 cases of so-called inversions of U.S. 
multinationals. In these transactions, the corporate structure is inverted in the sense 
that the U.S. parent becomes a subsidiary, and the earlier foreign subsidiary becomes 
the parent firm. Huizinga and Voget (2008) examine the parent-subsidiary structure of 
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multinational firms that are newly created through cross-border M&As. The actual 
parent firm is found to face a lower international tax burden than the actual subsidiary 
would face if it were the parent. This evidence on the direction of M&As is consistent 
with the present paper where across M&As it is found that the firms facing relatively 
low international tax burdens can offer relatively large takeover premiums. 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
implications of the international tax system for cross-border M&As. Section 3 
discusses the M&A data. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The international tax system and the takeover premium 
This section first describes the main features of the international tax system. 
The aim is to see how the creation of a multinational firm by a cross-border takeover 
may introduce additional international taxation of the target’s income. Next, we 
introduce a simple model of the determinants of the takeover premium, including 
international taxation.  
 
2.1. The international tax system 
Let us consider a multinational firm created by an international takeover. To 
fix ideas, let us assume that a firm in country i takes over a firm in country j, resulting 
in a parent firm in country i and a foreign subsidiary in country j.  The subsidiary’s 
income in country j is first subject to a corporate income tax tj. The first column of 
Table 1 indicates the statutory tax rate on corporate income for our sample of 
European countries, Japan and the United States in 2004. The tax rates in Table 1 
include regional and local tax rates as well as specific surcharges. Among the 
European countries, Germany has the highest tax rate at 38.3 percent, while Estonia is 
at the bottom with a zero tax rate. For each of the years 1985-2004, we have collected 
corporate tax rates and all other tax system information from the International Bureau 
of Fiscal Documentation and several other sources.3 These and other data sources and 
variable definitions are listed in Appendix A. Tax rates display considerable variation 
over time, which we exploit in our empirical analysis. For example, the average top 
statutory tax rate among countries in our sample involved in M&As in both 1985 and 
2004 falls from 48.1% to 33.7% in the intervening period. 
                                                 
3 For Eastern European countries, data are only available from 1990. 
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 The subsidiary can retain its after-tax corporate income or return it to the 
parent company as a dividend. The subsidiary country may levy a bilateral non-
resident withholding tax ijw on any outgoing dividend income. Bilateral dividend 
withholding taxes among countries in Europe, Japan and the United States for 2004 
are presented in Table 2. These rates are zero in many instances. Specifically, they are 
zero among long-standing EU member states on account of the EU Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive adopted in 1990. New EU member states such as the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Poland still maintain non-zero dividend withholding taxes vis-à-vis 
considerable numbers of European countries at the time of their accession in 2004. 
Non-EU member states in 2004 such as Bulgaria, Japan, Romania and the United 
States similarly maintain non-zero dividend withholding taxes in a considerable 
number of cases. The combined corporate and withholding tax rate in the subsidiary 
country is seen to be  jt  +  )1( jt− ijw . 
 Parent country i may tax the income generated abroad at a rate it . Let τij be the 
resulting double tax rate defined as the tax rate to be paid by the multinational firm on 
income from country j in excess of the corporate tax rate jt  in country j. In the 
absence of any double tax relief, the double tax τij equals it  +  )1( jt− jw . In practice, 
most countries provide some form of international double tax relief. Some countries 
operate a territorial or source-based tax system, effectively exempting foreign source 
income from taxation. In this instance, the double tax rate τij equals )1( jt− ijw . 
Alternatively, the parent country operates a worldwide or residence-based tax system. 
In this instance, the parent country in principle subjects income reported in country j 
to taxation, but it generally provides a foreign tax credit for taxes already paid in the 
subsidiary country. The OECD model treaty, which summarizes recommended 
practice, gives countries the choice between an exemption and a foreign tax credit as 
the only two ways to relieve double taxation (OECD, 1997).  
 The foreign tax credit reduces domestic taxes on foreign source income one-for-
one with the taxes already paid abroad. The foreign tax credit can be indirect in the 
sense that it applies to both the dividend withholding tax and the underlying 
subsidiary-country corporate income tax. Alternatively, the foreign tax credit is direct 
and applies only to the withholding tax. In either case, foreign tax credits in practice 
are limited to prevent the domestic tax liability on foreign source income from 
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becoming negative. In an indirect credit regime, the multinational effectively pays no 
additional tax in the parent country on account of the foreign tax credit, if the parent 
country tax rate tj is less than iijjj twtt ≥−+ )1( . Similarly, in a direct credit regime, 
the multinational pays no tax in the parent country due to the foreign tax credit 
limitation if iij tw ≥ .  A few countries with worldwide taxation do not provide foreign 
tax credits, but instead allow foreign taxes to be deducted from the multinational’s 
taxable income. For the various double tax relief conventions, Table 3 summarizes 
expressions for the double tax rate τij that, in the case of a foreign tax credit, depend 
on whether the foreign tax credit limitation is binding. 
 Countries tend to vary their method of double tax relief, i.e. through an 
exemption, credit or deduction, conditional on the existence of a double tax treaty 
with the other country. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 1 provide information on the double 
taxation rules applied to incoming dividends from treaty signatory and non-signatory 
countries. Finland and Spain, for instance, exempt dividend income from treaty 
partners, while they provide a direct and indirect foreign tax credit in the case of non-
treaty counties, respectively. In these instances, the existence of a tax treaty makes the 
method of double tax relief more generous. Across the categories of treaty and non-
treaty countries, the exemption system is seen to be the most common method of 
double tax relief, followed by foreign tax credits. At the same time, indirect foreign 
tax credit regimes are somewhat more common than direct foreign tax credits. As an 
exceptional case, the Czech Republic is seen to apply the deduction method to foreign 
dividends from non-treaty countries. The tendency to discriminate double tax relief on 
the basis of the existence of a tax treaty makes it necessary to know whether a 
bilateral tax treaty is effective in any given year. Such information for 2004 is 
available from, for instance, Huizinga and Voget (2008, Table W-II). 
 In describing the international tax system, we have assumed that the target firm 
becomes a foreign subsidiary of the new multinational firm. In a minority of cases, 
however, the target firm may instead become a foreign branch. In that instance, the 
additional taxation of the income of the target in country i generally differs. First, 
non-resident dividend withholding taxes normally do not apply in case a branch is 
created. Second, the parent country may apply a different method of double tax relief 
in case of foreign branch income.  The relevant relief methods for foreign branch 
income with and without a tax treaty are listed in columns 4 and 5 of Table 1, 
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respectively. Foreign tax credits rather than exemptions are seen to be the dominant 
method of providing double tax relief in case of a tax treaty. Thus, the additional 
parent country corporate income tax on the foreign-source income may on average be 
somewhat higher if a branch rather than a subsidiary is created.      
 Even in the absence of a cross-border takeover, the firm in country j has to pay 
tax in this country at a rate tj.4 This suggests that the proportional reduction in net-of-
tax income and ultimately dividends due to the takeover, denoted ijo , is given by 
.
1 j
ij
t−
τ
 By construction, this ‘overall’ additional international tax, ijo , represents both 
the non-resident dividend withholding tax and the additional parent country corporate 
tax brought on by the cross-border takeover. In the empirical work, it will also be 
interesting to consider these two components of the overall tax separately. For 
comparability, the withholding tax part and the parent country part both need to be 
expressed as shares of the target’s net-of-corporate-tax income. The dividend 
withholding part straightforwardly equals the dividend withholding tax rate, ijw , as 
the dividend withholding tax applies to the target’s income after corporate income tax. 
The part due to parent country corporate income tax, called parent tax below and 
denoted ijp ,  is calculated as the remainder or ijij wo − .  
 
2.2. Determinants of the takeover premium 
 In the empirical work, we will relate the takeover premium to the additional 
taxation of target firm j’s income brought on by the cross-border takeover.5 Prior to 
the takeover, the target’s share price is assumed to represents the present discounted 
value of the net-of-corporate tax income stream that is paid out as dividends.6 By 
itself, the overall additional international tax o (with subscripts omitted) reduces this 
                                                 
4 Firm j then will not be subject to a non-resident dividend withholding tax, if we assume the target’s 
shareholders to be local. Dividends paid to local shareholders may be subject to a resident dividend 
withholding tax, but this tax is generally a (partial) prepayment of the personal income tax on 
dividends. The analysis of this paper is restricted to business-level income taxation.  
5 Egger, Eggert and Winner (2007) find that foreign-owned firms pay relatively less corporate income 
tax in Germany. This could be on account of profits shifted out of Germany. In our setting, we cannot 
estimate a foreign ownership effect per se, as all cross-border M&As result in a foreign owned target 
firm. Rather, we estimate the impact of varying additional non-resident dividend withholding taxation 
and parent country corporate income taxation across different bilateral national relationships. 
6 A foreign takeover by a firm from a particular country is taken to be a low-probability event so that 
the expectation of such a takeover does not materially affect target firm pricing before a foreign bid 
announcement.   
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firm valuation proportionately. To motivate a cross-border takeover, there have to be 
efficiency or synergy gains that more than offset the additional tax burden. To reflect 
this, letγ  be the permanent proportional increase in the target’s income and dividends 
due to the takeover. We can now model the takeover premium as follows 
 Premium = [ ]1)1)(1( −−+ oγσ      (1) 
where σ  is the extent to which target shareholders can appropriate the net gains from 
the merger. Efficiency gains from a takeover may stem from several sources and at 
the same time additional taxation comes in the form of non-resident withholding 
taxation and parent country corporate income taxation. Acquirer and target 
shareholders could share the various efficiency benefits and tax costs of the merger in 
different ways. For simplicity’s sake, however, we will maintain a uniform sharing 
parameter, σ . For γ and o rather small, we can now approximate the premium in eq. 1 
as follows 
Premium  )( o−≈ γσ        (2) 
In the empirical work below, the synergy gains rate γ  is taken to be a function of a set 
x of firm and deal characteristics so that xβγ = . Substituting for γ  into eq. 2, we get 
the following expression for the premium which will serve as the starting point for our 
empirical work: 
Premium  ox σβ −≈ ˆ        (3) 
where βσβ =ˆ . Straightforwardly, we can replace o in eq. 3 by the distinct 
withholding tax and parent country tax variables, w and p, and estimate the impact of 
these two tax variables on the takeover premium separately.  
  
3.  The data 
The M&A data are taken from the Thomson Financial SDC database. This 
database provides pricing information and other deal characteristics as well as some 
accounting information of the two merging firms. Additional accounting data are 
obtained from Compustat North America and Compustat Global, while additional 
stock price data for acquirers are retrieved from Datastream. Our sample consists of 
948 mergers and acquisitions involving any two countries in a set of European 
countries, Japan and the United States between 1985 and 2004. A cross-border M&A 
leads to the creation of a new multinational firm, of which the target firm becomes a 
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foreign establishment. The database does not inform us whether the new foreign 
establishment takes the form of a subsidiary or a branch. As indicated, this choice 
matters as some countries tax the income derived from foreign subsidiaries and 
branches differently. As a benchmark case, we will assume that the target firm 
becomes a foreign subsidiary. In the empirical work, however, we also consider the 
alternative scenario where the target firm is converted into a foreign branch. 
 As seen in Table 4, acquiring firms in many instances reside in one of the 
larger countries in our sample. France, the United Kingdom and the United States 
each are home to at least 100 acquirers. Among the smaller countries, the Netherlands 
and Switzerland harbor a least 50 acquirers. Aggregate deal values are shown to 
exceed 100 billion U.S. dollars for France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, while they exceed 75 billion dollars for the Netherlands and 
Switzerland. The bid premium is calculated as the bid price relative to the market 
price of the target four weeks prior to the bid announcement, adjusted for the overall 
market price movement in the target country in the four intervening weeks. As in 
Officer (2003), we discard observations with a negative takeover premium or a 
takeover premium in excess of 2. This yields an average takeover premium for the 
overall sample of 0.45. Average takeover premiums per acquiring country differ 
substantially, with the few acquiring firms in Iceland paying a high average premium 
of 1.00 and the 14 acquiring firms in Spain paying a low average premium of 0.25. 
Among the large countries, France and Japan pay a relatively high average premium 
of 0.56.  
Next, the table provides information on the additional tax burdens created by 
the takeovers. The overall additional tax burden as a share of income net of the 
target’s corporate income tax is on average 3.95 percent. Japan and the United States 
are countries with residence-based corporate income tax system and relatively high 
tax rates, which explains high average values of the additional tax burden of 20.65 
and 11.07 percent, respectively. Austria has an average value of the overall additional 
tax of 2.86, even though it exempts foreign source income from taxation. In this 
instance, the value of the overall tax is entirely due to non-resident dividend 
withholding taxation in the target country. We see that Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg 
and Portugal have average values of the overall tax of zero. This reflects that these 
countries exempt foreign source income and have only several targets in countries 
without non-resident dividend withholding taxation. The break-down of the overall 
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tax into the withholding tax and the parent tax reveals that the average withholding 
tax at 0.79 is much smaller than the average double tax due to the parent-country 
corporate income taxation at 3.16 percent. U.S. acquirers are shown to pay a relatively 
high average withholding tax rate of 2.39 percent and a similarly high parent country 
tax of 8.73 percent. British acquirers instead pay an average withholding tax of only 
0.27 percent, with zero withholding taxes inside the EU due to the Parent and 
Subsidiary Directive of 1990. The table finally shows the percentage of observations 
per acquiring country with a positive value of the overall tax. The share of 
observations with a positive value of the overall tax in the overall sample is 51.4%.7 
All U.S. acquirers are shown to face an additional tax burden, as the U.S. corporate 
income tax exceeds the target country corporate income tax or there is a non-resident 
dividend withholding taxation in the target country. 
 Summary information on our sample from a target country perspective is 
provided in Table 5. The table indicates that targets are highly concentrated in the 
United Kingdom and the United States, with 221 and 389 targets in these two 
countries. Total values of targets in these two countries similarly exceed 200 billion 
dollars. Next, we see that U.S. targets command a relatively high average premium of 
0.53, only topped by an average premium of 0.67 for Danish targets. Next, the overall 
additional tax rate is highest for targets in Croatia and Estonia at 16.15 and 21.50 
percent, respectively, through a combination of high withholding tax rates and low 
corporate income tax rates. Targets in Greece and Luxembourg instead generate 
overall tax rates of zero, as the corresponding acquirers do not face double tax 
burdens in their home countries and pay no dividend withholding taxes in the target 
countries. Turning to the withholding tax rate, we see that Croatia, Estonia, Hungary 
and Japan impose average non-resident withholding taxes of at least 7.50 percent, 
while only five countries, among them the United Kingdom and the United States, 
abstain from levying such taxes in all cases. All the same, targets in the United 
Kingdom and the United States are taxed at average rates of 6.77 and 2.20 percent, 
respectively, by the acquiring countries, as seen by the values of parent tax variable. 
Specifically, targets in the U.S. are taxed by Japan, and by Belgium, France, Germany 
and Italy, as these latter four countries exempt only 95 percent of dividends. 
Correspondingly, substantial numbers of targets in the United Kingdom and the 
                                                 
7 The number of observations with a positive overall tax, withholding tax and parent tax is 487, 443 and 
116, respectively. 
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United States generate positive values of the additional overall tax burden as seen in 
the table. 
A main interest of this paper is to investigate the relationships between 
additional tax burdens created by international M&As and takeover premiums. Next, 
we examine whether any relationships are apparent in the raw data. Specifically, we 
present scatter diagrams of the additional tax rates, i.e. the overall tax, withholding tax 
and parent tax, against the takeover premium for the entire sample. First, Figure 1 
plots the overall tax against the takeover premium, yielding no apparent relationship. 
The correlation coefficient between the overall tax and the premium is estimated to be 
0.002 and it is not statistically significant. Next, Figure 2 plots the withholding tax 
against the premium, suggesting a negative relationship. Note that the withholding tax 
rate only takes on values of 0, 5, 10 or 15 percent in our sample. As a result, the 
scatter diagram essentially collapses to several line segments for withholding tax rates 
of 0 and 5 percent. To better gauge the distribution of the premium, Figure 3 
represents the same information after slightly ‘jittering’ the data points. This confirms 
an apparent negative relationship between the withholding tax and the premium. The 
correlation coefficient between these two variables is estimated to be -0.14 and it is 
significant at the 1 percent level. Finally, Figure 4 plots the parent tax variable against 
the premium, yielding no clear relationship. The correlation coefficient between these 
two variables is positive at 0.07, but it is not statistically significant. Simple 
correlations, of course, ignore a host of firm and deal characteristics affecting the 
premium, as taken into account in the empirical work below. 
 Table 6 provides summary statistics for the premium, the tax variables and the 
control variables in the subsequent empirical work. A first control is the log of the 
market value of the target as a measure of the target’s size. Larger targets are expected 
to command a smaller premium. Next, the book-to-market variable is the ratio of the 
target’s book value to market value. A relatively large book-to-market ratio suggests 
that the target is undervalued, and hence could command a larger premium. The 
leverage variable is the ratio of the target liabilities to target assets. A highly 
leveraged target could be prevented from additional borrowing to finance worthwhile 
investments. This suggests that a highly leveraged target can obtain a higher takeover 
premium.  
Several deal characteristics are included in the empirical work. Equity is a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of one if only equity is offered to target 
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shareholders, while cash is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if only cash 
is offered. All-equity deals, of course, provide target shareholders less certainty about 
the longer-term value of the deal, but it could have the advantage of postponing 
capital gains taxation. Thus, equity deals could generate either higher or lower 
takeover premiums. Hostile is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one, if the 
takeover is not supported by the board of the target firm. The bidding firm may need 
to pay relatively much, if target management does not support the takeover and 
correspondingly. Moeller (2005) finds a significant positive impact of the hostile 
nature of the takeover bid on the premium. Poison pill is a dummy variable indicating 
the presence of a defense measure against a takeover in the form of a poison pill. 
Comment and Schwert (1995) find a positive impact of poison pills on takeover 
premiums. 
Tender is a dummy variable that is one, if the takeover is preceded by a tender 
offer for all shares. If a bid is for more shares than necessary to gain control, the 
bidding firm may wish to bid relatively less. Moeller (2005) in fact finds a negative 
impact of the tender variable on the premium. At the same time, a tender offer may be 
called for, if target ownership is dispersed. With dispersed target ownership, it is more 
likely that the benefits from the takeover accrue to target shareholders in the form of a 
higher bid premium. Consistent with this, Officer (2003) and Rossi and Volpin (2004) 
find a positive impact of the tender offer variable on the takeover premium. Finally, 
cleanup is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one, if the bidder already owns at 
least 50 percent of the shares and seeks to acquire the remaining shares. In this 
instance, the bidder already has control over the target and hence may bid relatively 
little to acquire the remaining interest. Officer (2003) indeed finds a relatively small 
premium in case of a cleanup. 
   
 
 
4.  Empirical results 
This section first presents evidence on the relationship between international 
taxation and takeover bid premiums. This relationship appears to be stronger for firms 
that are more likely to suffer losses as can be explained by an imperfect offset of 
losses against other taxable income. This is examined next. Finally, the section 
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discusses the results of regressions of acquirer firm excess returns on the international 
tax variables.  
 
4.1. The takeover premium and international taxation 
Table 7 presents our basic regressions. All regressions in the table provide for 
acquirer country, target country and year fixed effects. To start, regression 1 relates 
the level of the bid premium to the overall tax variable and several controls. The 
estimated coefficient on the overall tax variable is -0.632 and it is significant at the 10 
percent level. Thus target firm shareholders are estimated to receive 63 cents less for 
each euro of additional tax computed to be triggered by the cross-border takeover. 
The premium is also negatively and significantly related to target market value as an 
index of target size. The relationship between the premium and the book-to-market 
value is estimated to be positive and significant to suggest that firms with a high 
book-to-market ratio are undervalued. Target leverage, in turn, enters the regression 
with a positive and significant coefficient to suggest that highly leveraged targets can 
benefit from the availability of additional capital as a result of the takeover. Next, we 
see that the bid premium is positively and significantly related to the equity variable. 
All-equity deals may require a higher premium, as the ultimate value of an offer in the 
form of equity is uncertain. The hostile variable is seen to obtain a negative but 
insignificant coefficient. The poison pill variable, in turn, obtains a positive 
coefficient that is significant at the 10 percent level to suggest that this defensive 
measure prompts potential acquirers to bid more. Further, the tender offer variable 
also obtains a positive and significant coefficient, possibly reflecting that the bidding 
firm has to pay more to purchase from dispersed owners through a tender offer. 
Finally, we find a negative and significant role for the cleanup variable, which 
suggests that bidding firms offer relatively little to expand a controlling interest in the 
target to full ownership. 
The overall tax variable represents the additional tax burdens generated by the 
takeover in the form of both withholding taxes and acquirer-country corporate income 
taxation. These different kinds of taxes could be valued differently by the newly 
created multinational firm. Specifically, acquirer-country taxes could in practice be 
discounted, if the multinational can engage in worldwide income averaging or 
foresees a tax amnesty or other acquirer-country tax reduction in the future. 
Regression 2 includes the withholding tax and parent tax variables separately to allow 
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for a different weighting of these taxes. The withholding tax variable obtains a 
coefficient of -1.847 that is significant at the 1 percent level, while the parent tax 
variable obtains a less negative coefficient of -0.516 that is not statistically significant. 
It can be seen that the estimated coefficient for the withholding tax variable is not 
significantly different from -1. Thus, our results are consistent with the view that the 
bid premium is reduced to fully reflect any future non-resident withholding tax 
liability. The incidence of the withholding tax thus appears to be on target 
shareholders, who mostly may be domestic residents.  
Regression 3 differs from regression 2 in that the dependent variable is the 
logarithm rather than the level of the bid premium. The withholding tax variable now 
is significant at the 5 percent level, while the corporate income becomes significant at 
10 percent. Among the controls, the leverage and equity variables are no longer 
significant at 5 percent, while the poison pill variable now is significant at 5 percent. 
Taking the logarithm of the bid premium reduces the R-squared from 0.23 to 0.22, 
which suggests the level specification of the bid premium is more appropriate. 
 Next, we restrict the sample to the manufacturing industry. There are reasons 
to suspect that the additional taxation engendered by a cross-border takeover are 
especially burdensome to manufacturing firms, as these firms may find it relatively 
difficult to shift their real assets and associated profits to low-tax jurisdictions. In 
regression 4, we again take the level of the bid premium as the dependent variable. 
The restriction to manufacturing firms reduces the sample to 407 observations. The 
withholding tax now obtains a coefficient of -3.108 that is significant at 1 percent, 
while the parent tax variable enters with a coefficient of -1.364 that is significant at 5 
percent. Bid premiums in the manufacturing industry thus appear to be more sensitive 
to any additional taxation resulting from an international takeover. 
 Overall, the results in Table 7 suggest that both withholding taxes and 
acquirer-country corporate income taxes lead to lower bid premiums in international 
takeovers. In the case of withholding taxes, the economic incidence – rather than the 
de jure imposition - appears to be fully on target firm shareholders. Countries that 
levy non-resident dividend withholding taxes no doubt aim to tax the foreign owners 
of local businesses. However, non-resident withholding taxes instead appear to be a 
tax on local residents, if these residents sell existing assets to foreigners. In that 
instance, the sale price is simply reduced to reflect the future non-resident withholding 
taxes. The incidence of acquirer-country taxes on the target’s income similarly 
 17
appears to be to some extent on target shareholders. The acquirer-country thus 
effectively exports part of its corporate income on newly created multinational firms 
to target-country shareholders. By itself, this provides the main acquiring countries 
with an incentive to maintain or even increase the taxation of the foreign-source 
income of resident multinationals. 
Table 8 presents some robustness checks, first taking regression 2 in Table 7 
as a starting point. Non-resident dividend withholding taxes may be considered more 
burdensome than acquirer-country taxation because the former are easier to enforce. 
In fact, enforcement of acquirer-country taxation regularly requires international 
cooperation and information exchange between the acquirer and target country tax 
authorities. This suggests that acquirer-country taxes are more burdensome, if 
acquirer and target countries routinely cooperate in tax matters. EU countries provide 
each other assistance in the enforcement of corporate income taxation, following a 
directive adopted in 1977. This suggests that acquirer-country taxation may carry 
more weight, if acquirer and target countries are both EU member states. Regression 1 
in Table 8 tests this by including an interaction term of the corporate income tax 
variable with a dummy variable signaling that both countries in the transaction are EU 
member states. At the same time, we include an interaction term of the parent tax 
variable with a dummy variable flagging that acquirer and target countries are not 
both EU members. The estimated parameter for the parent tax variable in case of joint 
EU membership is -1.197  and, as expected,  more negative than the estimate of -
0.372 in the alternative case, but both interaction terms are statistically insignificant.   
 As discussed before, the acquirer-country tax may not be effective, if acquirer 
countries allow their multinationals to engage in worldwide income averaging, i.e. to 
claim foreign tax credits for foreign taxes in high-tax countries against acquirer-
country taxes on income from low-tax countries. Similarly, acquirer-country taxes are 
discounted if multinationals can expect some future temporary or permanent reduction 
in acquirer-country taxes on repatriated income. Rules regarding income averaging 
and the prospects of future tax amnesties are, of course, country specific, which 
suggests that the effective burden of the acquirer-country tax may vary with the 
acquirer country. To test this, in regression 2 we include four interaction terms of the 
parent tax variable with dummy variables indicating that the acquirer country is Japan, 
the United Kingdom, the United States or any other country. Japan, the United 
Kingdom and the United States are three frequent acquirer countries with at least de 
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jure significant acquirer-country taxation (see Tables 1 and 4). The estimated 
parameters for the four interacted parent tax variables vary from -0.170 for the United 
States as the acquirer country to -1.057 for an acquirer country in the other category. 
All four parameters, however, are statistically insignificant. 
   Following Officer (2003), we have restricted the sample to bid premiums 
between 0 and 2. Prospective acquirers generally, of course, have to offer positive bid 
premiums for a takeover attempt to be successful. This requirement of generally 
positive bid premiums suggests that our sample is truncated from below. Such a 
truncation potentially introduces an attenuation of the parameter estimates for our tax 
variables.8 To check this, regression 3 in Table 7 applies the truncated regression 
technique with a lower truncation limit of 0 to the basic regression 1 of Table 7.  The 
overall tax variable now obtains a more negative coefficient of -1.019 that is 
significant at the 5 percent level. This result suggests that the coefficient on the 
overall tax variable in the basic regression may indeed be biased towards zero. 
Regression 4 further applies the truncation technique to regression 2 of Table 7 to 
yield more negative estimated coefficients for the withholding tax and parent tax 
variables of -3.717 and -0.882 that are significant at the 1 and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.  
 Next, regression 5 corrects standard errors for clustering across observations in 
the same target industry in a specification with separate withholding tax and parent 
tax variables. This yields an estimated coefficient for the withholding tax variable of -
1.847 that is significant at the 5 percent level, while the parent tax variable obtains an 
estimated coefficient of -0.516 that is statistically insignificant. Regression 6, in turn, 
excludes acquirer and target country fixed effects. In this specification, the 
withholding tax variable receives an estimate coefficient of -1.647 that is significant at 
the 1 percent level, and the parent tax enters with a coefficient of 0.026 that is 
statistically insignificant. 
 Table 9 presents some additional robustness tests of specific aspects of the 
international tax system. First, regression 1 in Table 9 takes the basic regression 1 of 
Table 7 and replaces our overall tax variable by an overall tax variable on a gross 
basis, i.e. a tax variable that calculates the additional withholding and corporate 
income tax triggered by the takeover as a share of the target’s income before target-
                                                 
8At the same time, international double taxation is expected to reduce cross-border M&A activity. 
Huizinga and Voget (2008) provide some evidence of this. 
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country corporate income tax. The contribution of the withholding tax to the overall 
tax burden thus defined would be appropriate, if the target for some reason, e.g. 
generous target-country depreciation allowances, does not pay corporate income tax 
in the target country. At the same time, some acquirers could fail to realize that any 
additional taxes triggered by an international takeover have to be paid out of the 
target’s net-of-corporate tax income stream. Regression 1 shows that this alternative 
overall tax variable obtains a coefficient of -0.928 that is significant at the 10 percent 
level.  The more negative coefficient no doubt reflects that the overall tax variable on 
a gross basis tends to be smaller than the overall tax on a net basis. 
 All tax variables have been constructed on the assumption that the target firm 
becomes a subsidiary rather than a foreign branch of the newly created multinational 
firm. This assumption surely is correct in the majority of cases. All the same, as a 
robustness check we construct an alternative overall tax variable (on a net basis) on 
the assumption that the target firm becomes a foreign branch. In this scenario, non-
resident dividend withholding taxes do not apply, as a foreign branch does not return 
its income to the parent firm in the form of dividends. In some instances, parent-
country taxation of foreign branches and of subsidiaries also differ, as seen in Table 1. 
All the same, in the majority of cases the overall tax variables in the branch and 
subsidiary scenarios are the same. In regression 2, the overall tax variable for the 
branch case is seen to obtain a coefficient of -0.357 that is statistically insignificant. 
This is consistent with the assumption that foreign subsidiaries are more relevant than 
foreign branches.  
 With a few exceptions, acquirer countries allow their multinational firms to 
defer acquirer-country tax on foreign-source income if this is retained abroad. Using 
information on deferral policies for 2004 from Huizinga and Voget (2008, Table W-
IV), we can construct a bilateral dummy variable indicating whether deferral is 
potentially not available for any pair of acquirer and target countries. Deferral is 
potentially not available if the acquirer is located in Japan, Portugal, Spain, the United 
Kingdom or the United States and if the target country corporate tax rate is 
sufficiently low.9  Regression 3 includes two interaction variables of the corporate 
income tax variable with two dummy variables signaling whether or not deferral is 
potentially not available. We expect the parent tax variable interacted with the deferral 
                                                 
9 See Huizinga and Voget (2008) for details on the construction of the no deferral dummy variable. 
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dummy to obtain a less negative coefficient as deferral would make acquirer-country 
taxation less burdensome. The results in regression 3 Table 9 show that the parent tax 
variable interacted with the deferral dummy obtains a slightly less negative coefficient 
of -0.507 – compared to -0.526 in case of no deferral -, but both estimated coefficients 
are statistically insignificant.   
 A final tax issue we address is the potential role of international profit shifting 
by a newly created multinational firm. International profit shifting within the new firm 
could serve to reduce its worldwide tax liability. In fact, some multinational could 
well be created with the exact purpose of creating subsequent international profit 
shifting opportunities. The tax savings per shifted euro are given by the difference in 
the corporate income tax rates of acquiring and target countries (with an adjustment 
for any additional taxation of the target’s income triggered by the international 
takeover), or vice versa. The absolute value of the tax difference is included as an 
additional explanatory variable in the bid premium regression 4 in Table 9. We expect 
the tax difference variable to obtain a positive coefficient to reflect that the acquirer is 
willing to pay more for a target that comes with subsequent profit shifting 
opportunities. The tax difference variable, however, enters the regression with an 
unexpectedly negative coefficient of -0.222 that is statistically insignificant. Hence, 
there is no evidence that bid premiums reflect profit shifting opportunities created by 
cross-border takeovers. 
 
4.2. Imperfect loss-offset and estimated tax coefficients 
Our tax variables represent the tax costs of a foreign acquisition in terms of the 
target’s after-corporate-tax income. In Tables 7 through 9, estimated coefficients on 
the tax variables frequently are seen to be less than minus one. In regression 4 in 
Table 7, for instance, the estimated coefficients for the withholding tax and corporate 
tax variables are -3.108 and -1.364, respectively. This suggests that the tax costs of a 
cross-border merger can exceed our tax variables as constructed from tax system 
information. A potential reason for this is that our tax variables ignore the possibility 
that firms can suffer losses that cannot be deducted from future profits or profits 
elsewhere within the multinational firm.10 In practice, loss-offset is imperfect. 
                                                 
10 Alternatively, note from (1) that the derivative of the premium with respect to the overall tax rate is 
given by σ(1+γ). This suggests that the productive gains achieved by the takeover increase the target’s 
post-merger taxable profits, and hence the valuation of its post-merger tax burden. 
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Countries tend to have rules that allow loss offset against past or future profits within 
a certain time span. A loss-making firm, however, may not return to profitability fast 
enough or even go bankrupt so as to limit loss-offset within the target country. At the 
same time, most countries do not allow resident multinational firms to deduct foreign-
source losses against domestically generated income, Austria and Denmark being 
notable exceptions. On account of imperfect loss-offset, the firm’s expected tax 
payments divided by its expected taxable income may exceed the statutory tax rate. 
As a result, our tax variables as derived from statutory information could 
underestimate the expected additional tax burden due to foreign ownership. This 
would explain estimated coefficients less than minus one.  
A simple model helps to elucidate the impact of imperfect loss-offset on 
estimated tax coefficients. Let us consider a firm that makes positive income 0>+ si  
with probability π , and negative income  0<− si  with probability 1 - π . Expected 
pre-tax income, denoted e, equals .)12( si −+ π  Let v be the statutory tax rate.  
Expected after-tax income, calculated as )( sive +−π , is taken to be positive. The 
expected tax payment is )( siv +π , or equivalently )])(1([ isev −−+ π . The expected 
tax payment would instead be ve, if there were full loss-offset. The ratio of expected 
tax payments without and with loss-offset can be computed as 1
)12(
))(1(1 >⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−+
−−+
si
is
π
π . 
Hence, we can expect estimated tax coefficients to be biased upward in absolute 
value, as our tax variables fail to account for imperfect loss-offset. Note that the 
computed ratio increases with the loss probability 1-π and the size of the loss s  - i for 
a given value of i. 
 This modeling suggests that we can find relatively large, negative estimated 
tax coefficients for subsamples of firms that are relatively likely to suffer sizeable 
losses. To explore this, we next estimate regressions analogous to equation 1 of Table 
7 for samples that vary in average leverage levels, on the assumption that high 
leverage makes it more likely that a firm sometimes incurs losses. Specifically, we 
construct samples of firms with leverage in the top 25 %, the top 50 %, and the top 75 
% of the benchmark sample of regression 1 in Table 7, respectively. Columns 1 – 3 of 
Table 10 report only the estimated tax coefficients for the three regressions for 
brevity. The estimated coefficient are seen to be -2.469, -0.922, -0.838, respectively, 
and thus to display an increasing pattern. These estimated coefficients are all less than 
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the estimate of -0.632 for the overall sample, reproduced as regression 7 in the table. 
Estimated tax coefficients thus indeed are lower for samples with relatively high-
leverage firms, as can be explained by imperfect loss-offset. To conclude this section, 
we next consider subsamples of firms on the basis of their book-to-market ratio. Firms 
with a low book-to-market ratio are ‘growth firms’ with high expected earnings 
growth and presumably high concomitant income risk. Thus low book-to-market 
firms may on average be more likely to suffer losses in some periods. We now 
construct subsamples of firms with book-to-market ratios in the lowest 25 percent, 
lowest 50 percent, and lowest 75 percent of the overall sample.  Estimated tax 
coefficients, in columns 4 – 6, now are -1.567, -0.944, and -0.872. Again, these 
parameter estimates are all less than the estimate of -0.632 for the overall sample and 
this pattern of increasing estimated coefficients is consistent with an imperfect loss-
offset explanation. 
 
4.3.  Acquirer excess returns and international taxation 
Parent country corporate taxation appears to affect the takeover premium less 
than non-resident dividend withholding taxes. Potentially, this reflects that the 
incidence of the parent country taxation of the target’s income is primarily on 
acquiring firm shareholders rather than on target firm shareholders. An incidence of 
parent country taxation primarily on acquiring firm shareholders could be the outcome 
of implicit bargaining between shareholders of the two firms. An outcome where 
acquiring firm shareholders bear most of the parent country tax burden would be 
expected, if potential acquiring firms from third countries are not subject to 
worldwide taxation in their home countries.  
In this section, we examine whether the additional international taxation 
following a cross-border acquisition can be shown to affect returns to acquiring firm 
shareholders. Specifically, we investigate whether acquiring firm excess stock market 
returns around the bid announcement reflect the international tax variables 
analogously to the takeover bid regressions in Tables 7-9. For this purpose, the 
acquirer excess return is constructed as the share price appreciation rate between the 
day after the bid announcement and four weeks prior to the announcement, adjusted 
for the return on the national stock market over the same period. Share price 
information from Datastream was collected to be able to compute acquiring firm 
excess returns for a sufficiently large set of firms. 
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 Regression 1 in Table 11 relates the acquirer firm excess return to the overall 
tax variable analogously to regression 1 of Table 7. The dependent variable is the 
acquirer excess return, not adjusted for any size difference the between acquiring and 
target firms. The sample contains 498 deals, with a mean acquirer excess return of 
0.54 percent and a mean bid premium of 48.56 percent.11 The overall tax variable 
obtains an estimated coefficient of -0.498 that is significant at the 10 percent level. 
The hostile variable obtains a negative coefficient that is significant at the 10 percent 
level to suggest that the acquirer has to pay more in case the bid is hostile. The poison 
variable enters with a positive and significant coefficient, perhaps because a poison 
pill tends to prevent value-reducing acquisitions. In regression 2, we include separate 
withholding and corporate tax variables that obtain coefficients of -0.378 and -0.501, 
respectively, with the latter being significant at 10 percent. These results suggest that 
acquiring firm returns are affected by the parent country taxation rather than the non-
resident dividend withholding taxation.  
Next, we limit the sample to deals where acquiring and target firms are of 
comparable size to exclude cases where the target firm is simply too small to 
materially affect acquiring firm returns. Specifically, we restrict the sample to deals 
where the ratio of acquiring firm market value to target market firm value four weeks 
prior to the deal announcement lies between 10.0 and 0.1. On account of this 
restriction, sample size is reduced to 217 deals. Columns 3 and 4 report regressions 
analogously to those in columns 1 and 2. Estimated tax coefficients in columns 3 and 
4 are seen to be of similar size as before but statistically insignificant. Finally, for this 
restricted sample we adjust the acquirer excess return variable to account for different 
market values of the two firms. Especially, the acquirer firm excess return is 
multiplied by the ratio of acquirer market value to target market value as of four 
weeks prior to deal announcement. This adjustment makes the estimated tax 
coefficient comparable to the one for the same variable in the bid premium 
regressions so that a coefficient of -1 indicates a complete pass-through of the target’s 
additional tax burden into acquirer market value. In regression 5, the overall tax 
variable now obtains a rather large negative coefficient of -3.341 that is statistically 
insignificant. Similarly, the withholding and corporate tax variables obtain large 
negative coefficients of -4.941 and -3.318 in regression 6 that are statistically 
                                                 
11 Matvos and Ostrovsky (2007) show that acquiring firm shareholders frequently hold stock in the 
targets with generally positive implications for their portfolio returns. 
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insignificant. Thus, our previous result that the parent tax variables negatively affects 
acquirer firm excess returns is not robust to changes in the sample size or definition of 
the acquirer firm excess return. Overall, we conclude that there is no systematic 
evidence that acquirer excess returns are affected by the prospective international 
taxation following a cross-border acquisition.   
 
5. Conclusion 
 Cross-border M&As can trigger additional taxation of the target’s income in 
the form of non-resident dividend withholding taxes and acquirer country corporate 
income taxes. This taxation reduces the net-of-tax gains from the business 
combination to be divided among acquirer and target shareholders. This paper 
provides evidence on how the additional taxation engendered by the cross-border 
takeover affects the benefits received by target firm shareholders by examining the 
sensitivity of bid premiums to the additional international taxation. At the same time, 
we examine whether acquirer firm excess returns around the bid announcement reflect 
the additional international taxation.  
We find that non-resident dividend withholding taxes appear to reduce bid 
premiums one-for one to suggest that the incidence of this taxation is fully on target 
firm shareholders. Bid premiums also reflect prospective parent country taxation of 
the target’s income, but less strongly. The relatively weak discounting of parent-
country corporate taxation into lower takeover premiums could reflect the practice of 
worldwide income averaging by multinational firms or perhaps the prospects of future 
international tax amnesties and moves from worldwide tax systems to territorial tax 
systems. In the U.S, such a tax regime change was recently proposed by the 
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005). At present, the U.K. is 
studying a similar proposal outlined in HM Treasury (2007). 
We find no systematic evidence that acquirer firm excess returns reflect any 
additional international taxation triggered by the cross-border takeover. Thus, target 
shareholders rather than acquirer shareholders appear to absorb the international tax 
costs of cross-border M&A. This is consistent with previous evidence that target 
shareholders tend to receive most if not all of the gains from mergers. 
 The apparent incidence of non-resident dividend withholding taxation on 
domestic shareholders in the case of a cross-border M&A is probably unintended by 
local tax policy makers. All the same, non-resident withholding taxes increase the 
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required pre-tax rate of return on the capital that foreign acquiring firms invest in their 
targets. As a result, these withholding taxes may well prevent some otherwise 
profitable cross-border M&As from occurring at all. Similarly, non-resident dividend 
taxation is likely to increase the required rate of return on investment projects within 
the target firm, if the capital is raised in the form of equity from the new parent. All 
this suggests that countries may do well to abolish their non-resident dividend 
withholding taxes. In the last two decades, these taxes have indeed been reduced on 
average, not least of account of the EU parent-subsidiary directive of 1990.  
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Table 1. Tax regimes across countries in 2004 
Country of 
residence 
     Corporate tax rate 
  
Subsidiary taxation 
  
Branch taxation 
 
   
With tax 
treaty 
Without tax 
treaty  
With recent 
tax treaty 
Without 
tax treaty 
                  (1)  (2)        (3)           (4)      (5) 
Austria  34.0   Exemption Exemption Exemption         Exemption 
Belgium  34.0   Exemptiona Exemptiona Exemption Deductiond 
Bulgaria  19.5   Credit Creditb   Credit 
Croatia 20.0   Exemption Exemption   Credit 
Czech Republic 28.0   Credit Deduction  Credit Credit 
Denmark  30.0   Exemption Exemption Credit Credit 
Estonia  0.0   Credit Credit  Credit Deduction 
Finland  29.0   Exemption Creditb Credit Credit 
France  35.4   Exemptiona Exemptiona Exemption Exemption 
Germany  38.3   Exemptiona Exemptiona Exemption Credit 
Greece  35.0   Credit Credit  Credit Credit 
Hungary  17.7   Exemption Exemption Exemption Credit 
Iceland  18.0   Exemption Exemption  Credit 
Ireland  12.5   Credit Credit  Credit Deduction 
Italy  37.3   Exemptiona Exemptiona Credit Credit 
Japan  42.0   Credit Credit  Credit Credit 
Latvia  15.0   Exemption Exemption Credit Credit 
Lithuania  15.0   Exemption Exemption Credit Credit 
Luxembourg 30.4   Exemption Exemption Exemption  Credite 
Netherlands 34.5   Exemption Exemption Exemption Exemption 
Norway  28.0   Exemption Exemption  Credit 
Poland  19.0   Credit Credit  Credit Credit 
Portugal  27.5   Exemptionc Exemptionc Credit Credit 
Romania  25.0   Credit Credit  Credit Credit 
Slovak Rep 19.0   Exemption Exemption Credit No relief 
Spain  35.0   Exemption Credit Credit Credit 
Sweden  28.0   Exemption Exemption Credit Credit 
Switzerland 24.0   Exemption Exemption Exemption Exemption 
United Kingdom 30.0   Credit Credit  Credit Credit 
United States 40.0   Credit Credit  Credit Credit 
Notes: The first column lists the corporate income tax rates including average state and municipal taxes 
where applicable with respect to retained earnings. The second column lists the countries' method for 
tax relief that applies to dividend income in presence of a tax treaty. The third column provides the 
same information in absence of a tax treaty. Note that the method of tax relief for dividend income does 
not vary between different tax treaties because it is always determined by the domestic tax code. 
Double tax treaties have no authority over dividend taxation by the receiving country. However, the 
provisions of the domestic tax code are often conditional on the presence of a tax treaty. The parent 
firm is assumed to hold a majority in the dividend-paying subsidiary such that participation exemptions 
take effect. The fourth column lists the method for tax relief that applies to foreign branch income in 
the presence of a tax treaty. The method for tax relief in the presence of a tax treaty can vary among 
treaties, in which case no unique applicable tax regime can be indicated. The fourth column indicates 
the method of tax relief for foreign branch income only if a country has consistently applied the same 
method in all tax treaties becoming effective in the year 2000 or later. The last column lists the method 
for tax relief that applies to foreign branch income in the absence of a tax treaty. 
Footnotes: a: Only 95 percent of the dividend is exempted. b: Only withholding taxes are credited but 
not the underlying corporate income tax. c: Only dividend income from EU sources is exempted. Other 
dividend income is taxed. Tax credits are provided for withholding taxes. d: Belgium only charges 25 
percent of the standard tax rate if the deduction regime applies in order to reduce double taxation. e : In 
case of excess foreign tax credits, Luxembourg allows a deduction of the excess foreign tax taxes as 
expenses. 
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  Table 2.  Withholding tax rates in 2004 
 
Source country No treaty Aus Bel Bul Cro Cz Den Est Fin Fra Ger Gre Hun Icel Irel Ita Jap Lat Lith Lux Neth Nor Pol Por Rom Slvk Spa Swe Swi UK USA 
Austria   0 0 10 0 15 0 0 0 0 10 25 0 0 10 25 25 0 0 5 10 0 15 10 0 0 0 0 5 5 
Belgium 25     0  5 5 0 15 0 0 0 0 10 5 0 0 5 15 5 0 0 5 5 0 5 15 0 0 10 0 5 5 
Bulgaria 15 0 10  10 5 15 0 5 15 10 10 15 5 10 10 15 15 5 5 15 10 10 10 10 5 10 5 10 15 15 
Croatia 15 0 5 5  5 5 5 5 15 5 5 15 5 10 15 5 5 15 0 15 5 15 5 5 15 5 5 5 15 15 
Czech Rep 15 10 5 10 5  5 5 10 5 15 5 5 5 15 10 5 5 5 0 5 5 15 10 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 
Denmark 28 0 0 5 5 15  0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 5 0 10 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Estonia 26 15 15 26 5 15 15  5 15 26 15 5 15 5 26 15 15 26 15 0 15 15 26 26 15 15 0 15 0 0 
Finland 29 0 0 10 5 15 0 15  0 0 15 0 0 0 10 15 15 0 0 0 15 0 5 15 0 0 5 0 5 5 
France 25 0 0 5 5 10 0 5 0  0 5 5 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 0 5 0 10 10 0 0 0 0 5 5 
Germany 21 0 0 15 15 5 0 5 0 0  5 5 0 0 15 5 5 0 0 0 5 0 5 5 0 0 0 0 5 5 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hungary 20 10 10 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10  5 10 10 20 20 5 5 10 10 15 5 5 5 0 10 5 5 5 
Iceland 15 15 5 15 15 5 0 5 0 5 5 15 15  15 15 5 5 5 0 0 5 10 15 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 
Ireland 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Italy 27 0 0 10 10 15 0 5 0 0 0 0 10 27 0  27 5 0 0 15 10 0 10 15 0 0 15 0 5 5 
Japan 20 10 10 10 20 10 10 20 10 0 10 20 10 20 10 10  20 5 5 5 10 20 10 10 10 5 10 10 10 10 
Latvia 10 10 5 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 10 10 5 5 10 10  10 5 5 5 10 10 10 10 5 5 5 5 5 
Lithuania 10 10 5 10 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 10 10 5 5 5 10 0  5 5 5 10 10 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Luxembourg 0a 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands 25 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 5 5 5 0  5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 
Norway 25 0 0 15 15 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 5 5 5 0 0  0 10 5 0 0 5 0 15 15 
Poland 19 10 5 10 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 19 10 5 0 10 10 5 5 5 5 5  5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Portugal 25 0 0 10 25 15 0 15 0 0 0 0 15 10 0 0 25 10 10 0 0 10 10  15 0 0 10 0 5 5 
Romania 15 15 5 10 5 10 10 15 5 10 5 15 5 15 3 10 10 10 10 5 0 10 5 10  10 10 10 10 10 10 
Slovak Rep 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 0 0 
Spain 15 0 0 5 15 5 0 5 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 0 10 15 5 0 0 15 5 0 10 5  10 0 10 10 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0 0 
Switzerland 35 0 10 5 5 5 0 5 5 0 0 5 10 5 10 15 10 5 5 0 0 5 5 10 10 5 10 0  5 5 
UK 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 
USA 0b  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  
Notes: The “No treaty” column lists the withholding tax rates that apply to dividend payments to non-resident corporations in the absence of a tax treaty or any domestic regulation 
with regard to the EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive. Minimum participation exemptions are taken into account. The remaining part of the table list the applicable withholding tax rate 
on a bilateral basis where the source countries are listed on the left and the receiving countries at the top. The table contains data for January 1st 2004. Footnotes: a: The zero 
withholding tax does not apply to all types of Luxembourg corporations. For some types it is 20 percent if there are no reductions due to tax treaties. b: Withholding tax is not imposed 
on dividends paid to foreign corporations if the dividends are effectively connected to the conduct of a trade or business in the United States.
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Table 3.  Expressions for the double tax rate ijτ  
 
Form of double tax relief  Condition  Double tax rate ijτ  
None        it + (1 - jt ) ijw  
Indirect foreign tax credit  jt + (1- jt ) ijw ≥ it  (1 - jt ) ijw  
     jt + (1- jt ) ijw <  it  it  - jt  
Direct foreign tax credit  ijw ≥ it   (1 - jt ) ijw  
     ijw < it   (1 - jt ) ( )iji wt −  
Exemption       (1 - jt ) ijw  
Deduction       (1 - jt ) [ ijw +(1- ijw ) it ] 
 
Notes: The variable it  is the corporate income tax rate in parent country ;i  jt  is the corporate 
income tax rate subsidiary country ;j ijw  is the withholding tax rate for dividends repatriated 
from a subsidiary in country j to a parent firm in country i . In case of a direct foreign tax 
credit, foreign corporate income taxes are taken to be deductible expenses against taxable 
corporate income in the parent country.
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Table 4. Summary information on transactions by acquiring nation 
 
 Number Total value of 
transactions 
Mean 
premium 
Mean 
overall tax rate 
Mean 
withholding tax 
rate 
Mean 
parent tax 
rate 
Percentage of 
M&As with 
positive overall tax 
rate 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal. 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
7 
32 
27 
15 
100 
87 
2 
2 
20 
38 
35 
7 
82 
5 
1 
14 
49 
52 
202 
171 
0.761 
18.965 
6.391 
17.123 
130.226 
162.836 
3.139 
0.116 
6.270 
26.819 
24.095 
0.982 
79.099 
1.690 
0.022 
16.145 
23.717 
76.796 
541.489 
131.109 
0.41 
0.46 
0.49 
0.50 
0.56 
0.44 
0.34 
1.00 
0.45 
0.52 
0.56 
0.34 
0.45 
0.35 
0.31 
0.25 
0.47 
0.48 
0.45 
0.47 
2.86 
2.54 
1.11 
0 
2.21 
2.12 
3.57 
0 
1.90 
4.36 
20.65 
0 
0.06 
5.60 
0 
0.71 
0.61 
1.25 
1.21 
11.07 
2.86 
0.47 
1.11 
0 
0.30 
0.52 
0 
0 
0 
0.92 
0.29 
0 
0.06 
0 
0 
0.71 
0.61 
1.25 
0.27 
2.39 
0 
2.07 
0 
0 
1.91 
1.60 
3.57 
0 
1.90 
3.44 
20.36 
0 
0 
5.60 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.94 
8.73 
28.6 
100 
22.2 
0 
100 
69 
50 
0 
25 
92.1 
100 
0 
1.2 
20 
0 
7.1 
8.2 
17.3 
11.9 
100 
Total 948 1267.791 0.47 3.95 0.79 3.16 51.4 
Notes: Value of transactions is in billions of U.S. dollars. The premium is computed as a share. The overall tax rate is the overall additional double tax rate as a percent of income net 
of the target country corporate income tax. Withholding tax rate is the non-resident dividend withholding tax rate in percent. Parent tax rate is the additional acquirer country corporate 
tax rate in percent. Minimum participation exemptions are taken into account in calculating the withholding tax rate.  
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Table 5. Summary information on transactions by target nation 
 
 Number 
 
 
Value of 
transactions 
 
Mean 
premium 
 
Mean overall tax 
rate 
 
Mean 
withholding tax 
rate 
Mean 
parent tax 
rate 
Percentage of 
M&As with positive 
overall tax rates 
Austria 
Belgium 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
7 
17 
1 
2 
5 
2 
10 
87 
30 
4 
3 
11 
10 
12 
2 
2 
1 
31 
27 
24 
3 
1 
8 
32 
6 
221 
389 
12.439 
27.089 
0.405 
1.199 
6.854 
0.080 
15.278 
48.839 
222.442 
2.208 
0.130 
6.136 
1.875 
5.623 
0.085 
0.120 
1.789 
36.357 
12.953 
1.466 
0.798 
0.134 
4.248 
55.668 
3.082 
228.338 
572.159 
0.40 
0.36 
0.09 
0.47 
0.67 
0.46 
0.39 
0.44 
0.35 
0.16 
0.20 
0.42 
0.41 
0.32 
0.16 
0.44 
0.41 
0.43 
0.44 
0.18 
0.34 
0.39 
0.35 
0.48 
0.25 
0.50 
0.53 
3.23 
1.35 
16.15 
5.91 
7.56 
21.50 
2.09 
2.09 
2.06 
0 
10.71 
14.40 
3.46 
8.21 
5.00 
5.00 
0 
2.03 
4.37 
7.06 
3.95 
6.82 
2.73 
6.26 
6.33 
6.77 
2.20 
1.43 
0.29 
10.00 
5.00 
2.00 
7.50 
0.50 
1.26 
2.00 
0 
8.33 
0 
3 
7.92 
5.00 
5.00 
0 
0.81 
3.33 
4.79 
3.33 
5.00 
2.50 
1.56 
5.00 
0 
0 
1.80 
1.06 
6.15 
0.91 
5.56 
14.00 
1.59 
0.83 
0.06 
0 
2.38 
14.40 
0.46 
0.30 
0 
0 
0 
1.23 
1.04 
2.26 
0.61 
1.82 
0.23 
4.69 
1.33 
6.77 
2.20 
57.1 
58.8 
100 
100 
60 
100 
40 
56.3 
43.3 
0 
100 
81.8 
60 
100 
100 
100 
0 
54.8 
55.6 
91.7 
66.7 
100 
37.5 
65.6 
100 
70.6 
31.6 
Total 948 1267.791 0.47 3.95 0.79 3.16 51.4 
Notes: Value of transactions is in billions of U.S. dollars. The premium is computed as a share. The overall tax rate is the overall additional double tax rate as a percent of income net 
of the target country corporate income tax. Withholding tax rate is the non-resident dividend withholding tax rate in percent. Parent tax rate is the additional acquirer country corporate 
tax rate in percent. Minimum participation exemptions are taken into account in calculating the withholding tax rate.
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Table 6.  Summary statistics of premium, tax and control variables. 
 
 Number of observations Average Standard derivation Minimum Maximum 
Premium 
Overall tax rate 
Withholding tax rate 
Parent tax rate rate 
Market value 
Book-to-market 
Leverage 
Equity 
Cash 
Hostile 
Poison 
Tender 
Cleanup 
948 
948 
948 
948 
943 
783 
789 
948 
948 
948 
946 
946 
948 
0.47 
3.95 
0.79 
3.16 
5.28 
0.69 
0.58 
0.07 
0.64 
0.05 
0.01 
0.73 
0.16 
0.34 
6.19 
2.36 
5.89 
1.78 
0.71 
0.26 
0.25 
0.48 
0.21 
0.10 
0.44 
0.36 
0.00 
0 
0 
0 
-0.21 
-1.87 
0.01 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1.98 
28.18 
15 
28.18 
11.26 
7.29 
2.25 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
Notes: The premium is computed as a share. The overall tax rate is the overall additional double tax as a share of income net of the target country corporate income tax in percent. 
Withholding tax is the non-resident dividend withholding tax in percent. Minimum participation exemptions are taken into account in calculating the withholding tax rate. Parent tax 
rate is the additional acquirer country corporate tax as a share of income net of the target country corporate income tax in percent. Market value is the log of the market value of the 
target in millions of U.S. dollars. Book-to-market is the ratio of the book and market values of the target. Leverage is the ratio of the liabilities and assets of the target. Equity is 
dummy variable signaling an all equity transaction. Cash is a dummy variable signaling an all cash transaction, Hostile is a dummy variable signaling the offer is not supported by the 
board of the target. Poison is a dummy variable signaling the presence of a poison pill. Tender is a dummy variable signaling there is a tender offer for all shares. Cleanup is a dummy 
variable signaling the acquisition of a remaining interest with initial interest exceeding 50 percent. 
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Table 7. The impact of taxes on bid premiums 
 Combined tax 
variable 
(1) 
Split tax 
variable 
(2) 
Logged 
premium 
(3) 
Manufacturing 
 
(4) 
Overall tax -0.632 
(0.328)* 
   
Withholding tax  -1.847 
(0.624)** 
-3.921 
(1.961)** 
-3.108 
(0.969)***
Parent tax  -0.516 
(0.338) 
-1.667 
(0.979)* 
-1.364 
(0.552)** 
Market value -0.033 
(0.008)***
-0.033 
(0.008)***
-0.043 
(0.025)* 
-0.025 
(0.011)** 
Book-to-market 0.060 
(0.022)***
0.060 
(0.022)***
0.099 
(0.049)** 
0.062 
(0.039) 
Leverage 0.098 
(0.048)** 
0.095 
(0.048)** 
0.125 
(0.138) 
0.159 
(0.092)* 
Equity 0.142 
(0.058)** 
0.134 
(0.059)** 
0.297 
(0.158)* 
0.157 
(0.086)* 
Cash 0.031 
(0.029) 
0.029 
(0.029) 
0.089 
(0.094) 
0.020 
(0.043) 
Hostile -0.044 
(0.052) 
-0.039 
(0.052) 
-0.131 
(0.178) 
-0.129 
(0.079) 
Poison 0.289 
(0.150)* 
0.284 
(0.174)* 
0.643 
(0.257)** 
0.187 
(0.117) 
Tender 0.085 
(0.027)***
0.083 
(0.027)***
0.207 
(0.079)***
0.118 
(0.042)***
Cleanup -0.121 
(0.038)***
-0.123 
(0.038)***
-0.517 
(0.137)***
-0.189 
(0.056)***
     
N 781 781 781 407 
R2 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.32 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1, 2 and 4 is the premium as a share. The dependent variable 
in column 3 is the log of the premium as a share. The overall tax is the overall additional double tax as 
a share of income net of the target country corporate income tax. Withholding tax is the non-resident 
dividend withholding tax as a share. Parent tax is the acquirer country corporate tax as a share of 
income net of the target country corporate income tax. Market value is the log of the market value of 
the target in millions of U.S. dollars. Book-to-market is the ratio of the book and market values of the 
target. Leverage is the ratio of the liabilities and assets of the target. Equity is dummy variable 
signaling an all equity transaction. Cash is a dummy variable signaling an all cash transaction. Hostile 
is a dummy variable signaling the offer is not supported by the board of the target. Poison is a dummy 
variable signaling the presence of a poison pill. Tender is a dummy variable signaling there is a tender 
offer for all shares. Cleanup is a dummy variable signaling the acquisition of a remaining interest with 
initial interest exceeding 50 percent. In column 4 the sample is restricted to manufacturing. All 
regressions are estimated using OLS and include acquirer country, target country and year fixed effects. 
We report robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, 
and *** significance at 1 percent. 
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Table 8. The impact of taxes on bid premiums: robustness checks 
 EU vs non EU 
(1) 
Parent countries 
(2) 
Truncated 
 
(3) 
Truncated 
 
(4) 
Clustering 
 
(5) 
No country effects 
(6) 
Overall tax   -1.019 
(0.520)** 
   
Withholding  tax -1.765 
(0.618)***
-1.689 
(0.616)*** 
 -3.717 
(1.448)***
-1.847 
(0.634)** 
-1.647 
(0.428)*** 
Parent tax    -0.882 
(0.528)* 
-0.516 
(0.414) 
0.026 
(0.193) 
Parent tax EU -1.197 
(0.800) 
     
Parent tax non EU -0.372 
(0.367) 
     
Parent tax Japan  -0.373 
(0.480) 
    
Parent tax UK  -0.870 
(1.042) 
    
Parent tax US  -0.170 
(0.638) 
    
Parent tax Other  -1.057 
(0.735) 
    
Market value -0.033 
(0.008)***
-0.032 
(0.008)*** 
-0.060 
(0.014)***
-0.060 
(0.013)** 
-0.033 
(0.009)***
-0.030 
(0.708)*** 
Book-to-market 0.061 
(0.022)***
0.060 
(0.022)*** 
0.077 
(0.031)** 
0.076 
(0.030)** 
0.060 
(0.011)***
0.057 
(0.020)*** 
Leverage 0.096 
(0.048)** 
0.094 
(0.048)* 
0.167 
(0.080)** 
0.161 
(0.079)** 
0.095 
(0.019)***
0.078 
(0.045)* 
Equity 0.132 
(0.059)** 
0.130 
(0.060)** 
0.255 
(0.093)***
0.243 
(0.093)***
0.134 
(0.040)** 
0.126 
(0.057)** 
Cash 0.028 0.027 0.057 0.054 0.029 0.043 
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(0.029) (0.029) (0.052) (0.051) (0.010)** (0.025)* 
Hostile -0.039 
(0.052) 
-0.038 
(0.052) 
-0.071 
(0.096) 
-0.064 
(0.096) 
-0.039 
(0.058) 
-0.057 
(0.051) 
Poison 0.284 
(0.147)* 
0.277 
(0.147)* 
0.414 
(0.200)** 
0.406 
(0.195)** 
0.284 
(0.143)* 
0.323 
(0.141)** 
Tender 0.082 
(0.027)***
0.082 
(0.028)*** 
0.157 
(0.049)***
0.152 
(0.049)***
0.083 
(0.022)** 
0.043 
(0.025)* 
Cleanup -0.122 
(0.038)***
-0.121 
(0.038)*** 
-0.245 
(0.076)***
-0.245 
(0.075)***
-0.123 
(0.041)** 
-0.098 
(0.035) 
       
N 781 781 781 781 781 781 
R2 0.23 0.23   0.23 0.17 
Notes: The dependent variable is the premium as a share. The overall tax is the overall additional double tax as a share of income net of the target country corporate income 
tax. Withholding tax is the non-resident dividend withholding tax as a share. Parent tax is the additional acquirer country corporate tax as a share of income net of the target 
country corporate income tax. Parent tax EU is parent tax interacting with a dummy variable signaling that both acquirer and target countries are EU member states. Parent 
tax non EU is parent tax interacting with a dummy variable signaling that not both acquirer and target countries are EU member states. Parent tax US is parent tax interacted 
with a dummy variable signaling that the acquirer country is the US. Parent tax UK is parent tax interacted with a dummy variable signaling that the acquirer country is the 
UK. Parent tax Japan is parent tax interacted with a dummy variable signaling that the acquirer country is Japan. Parent tax other is parent tax interacted with a dummy 
variable signaling that the acquirer country is any other country. Market value is the log of the market value of the target in millions of U.S. dollars. Book-to-market is the 
ratio of the book and market values of the target. Leverage is the ratio of the liabilities and assets of the target. Equity is dummy variable signaling an all equity transaction. 
Cash is a dummy variable signaling an all cash transaction. Hostile is a dummy variable signaling the offer is not supported by the board of the target. Poison is a dummy 
variable signaling presence of a poison pill. Tender is a dummy variable signaling there is a tender offer for all shares. Cleanup is a dummy variable signaling the acquisition 
of a remaining interest with initial interest exceeding 50 percent. Regressions 1 through 5 include acquirer country, target country and year fixed effects, while regression 6 
includes only year fixed effects. The regressions in columns 1, 2, 5 and 6 are estimated using OLS. In regression 5, we correct standard errors for clustering across industry 
observations. For regressions 1, 2, 5 and 6, we report robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions 3 and 4 are truncated regressions with a lower limit of zero. * denotes 
significance at 10%, ** significance at 5%, and *** significance at 1 percent. 
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Table 9. The impact of taxes on bid premiums: additional tax considerations 
 
 Gross income 
(1) 
Branch 
(2) 
Deferral 
(3) 
Profit shifting 
(4) 
Overall tax gross -0.928 
(0.480)* 
   
Overall tax  -0.357 
(0.352) 
  
Withholding tax   -1.851 
(0.622)***
-1.764 
(0.644)***
Parent tax     -0.543 
(0.337) 
Parent tax deferral   -0.507 
(0.427) 
 
Parent tax no 
deferral 
  -0.526 
(0.528) 
 
Tax difference    -0.222 
(0.319) 
Market value -0.033 
(0.008)***
-0.033 
(0.008)***
-0.033 
(0.008)***
-0.032 
(0.008)***
Book-to-market 0.061 
(0.022)***
0.061 
(0.022)***
0.060 
(0.022)***
0.060 
(0.022)***
Leverage 0.098 
(0.048)** 
0.097 
(0.048)** 
0.095 
(0.048)** 
0.094 
(0.048)** 
Equity 0.142 
(0.058)** 
0.143 
(0.058)** 
0.134 
(0.059)** 
0.135 
(0.059)** 
Cash 0.031 
(0.029) 
0.033 
(0.029) 
0.029 
(0.029) 
0.030 
(0.029) 
Hostile -0.044 
(0.052) 
-0.040 
(0.052) 
-0.039 
(0.052) 
-0.041 
(0.052) 
Poison 0.290 
(0.150)* 
0.284 
(0.149)* 
0.284 
(0.147)* 
0.284 
(0.148)* 
Tender 0.085 
(0.027)***
0.084 
(0.027)***
0.083 
(0.027)***
0.082 
(0.027)***
Cleanup -0.121 
(0.038)***
-0.118 
(0.038)***
-0.123 
(0.038)***
-0.124 
(0.038)***
     
N 781 781 781 781 
R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
Notes: The dependent variable is the premium as a share. The overall tax gross is the overall additional 
double tax computed as a share of the income of the target before the target country corporate income 
tax. The overall tax is the overall additional double tax as a share of income net of the target country 
corporate income tax. In column 2 the overall tax is computed on the assumption that the target 
becomes a foreign branch. Withholding tax is the non-resident dividend withholding tax as a share. 
Parent tax is the additional acquirer country corporate tax as a share of income net of the target country 
corporate income tax. Parent tax deferral is the acquirer country corporate tax as a share of income net 
of the target country corporate income tax interacted with a dummy variable signaling that acquirer 
country tax can be deferred if the income is not repatriated. Parent tax no deferral is the acquirer 
country corporate tax as a share of income net of the target country corporate income tax interacted 
with a dummy variable signaling that acquirer country tax cannot be deferred. Tax difference is the 
absolute value of the difference of the tax rates of the acquirer and target countries where the latter is 
adjusted to take into account non-resident withholding taxation and acquirer country corporate income 
taxation of the income of the target. Market value is the log of the market value of the target in millions 
of U.S. dollars. Book-to-market is the ratio of the book and market values of the target. Leverage is the 
ratio of the liabilities and assets of the target. Equity is dummy variable signaling an all equity 
transaction. Cash is a dummy variable signaling an all cash transaction. Hostile is a dummy variable 
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signaling the offer is not supported by the board of the target. Poison is a dummy variable signaling the 
presence of a poison pill. Tender is a dummy variable signaling there is a tender offer for all shares. 
Cleanup is a dummy variable signaling the acquisition of a remaining interest with initial interest 
exceeding 50 percent. All regressions are estimated using OLS and include acquirer country, target 
country and year fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance 
at 10%, ** significance at 5%, and *** significance at 1 percent. 
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Table 10. Tax coefficients and firm heterogeneity in expected losses 
 Leverage Book-to-market  
 Top 25 percent Top 50 
percent 
Top 75 percent Bottom 25 
percent 
Bottom 50 
percent 
Bottom 75 
percent 
Full sample     
          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Overall 
tax 
-2.469 
(0.904)*** 
-0.922 
(0.526)* 
-0.838 
(0.373)** 
-1.567 
(0.769)** 
-0.944 
(0.479)** 
-0.872 
(0.380)** 
-0.632 
(0.328)* 
        
N 195 390 586 195 390 586 781 
R2 0.35 0.29 0.26 0.36 0.27 0.20 0.23 
 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is the premium as a share. The overall tax is the overall additional double tax as a share of income net of the target country corporate income 
tax.  Regressions include several variables that are not reported. These are Market value defined as the log of the market value of the target in millions of U.S. dollars, Book-
to-market defined as the ratio of the book and market values of the target, Leverage defined as the ratio of the liabilities and assets of the target. Equity defined as a dummy 
variable signaling an all equity transaction, Cash defined as a dummy variable signaling an all cash transaction, Hostile defined as a dummy variable signaling the offer is not 
supported by the board of the target, Poison defined as a dummy variable signaling the presence of a poison pill, Tender defined as  a dummy variable signaling there is a 
tender offer for all shares, and Cleanup defined as a dummy variable signaling the acquisition of a remaining interest with initial interest exceeding 50 percent. Regressions 1-
3 are for samples based on the distribution of the leverage variable. Regressions 4 - 6 are for samples based on the distribution of the book-to-market variable. All regressions 
are estimated using OLS and include acquirer country, target country and year fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, 
** significance at 5%, and *** significance at 1 percent
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Table 11. The impact of taxes on acquirer excess returns 
 Relative size restriction Return adjusted for relative size 
          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Overall tax -0.498 
(0.265)* 
 -0.653 
(0.428) 
 -3.341 
(2.263) 
 
Withholding  
tax 
 
 
-0.378 
(0.861) 
 -0.594 
(1.629) 
 -4.941 
(10.427) 
Parent tax  -0.501 
(0.259)* 
 -0.654 
(0.422) 
 -3.318 
(2.222) 
Market 
value 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.018 
(0.008)**
-0.018 
(0.009)**
-0.142 
(0.065)**
-0.141 
(0.066)**
Book-to-
market 
0.015 
(0.012) 
0.015 
(0.012) 
0.006 
(0.033) 
0.006 
(0.033) 
-0.112 
(0.173) 
-0.111 
(0.174) 
Leverage -0.026 
(0.032) 
-0.025 
(0.032) 
-0.064 
(0.065) 
 -0.064 
(0.065) 
 -0.643 
(0.395) 
 -0.649 
(0.394) 
Equity 0.024 
(0.030) 
0.024 
(0.031) 
0.070 
(0.045) 
0.070 
(0.045) 
0.133 
(0.253) 
0.133 
(0.254) 
Cash 0.013 
(0.020) 
0.013 
(0.020) 
0.034 
(0.037) 
0.034 
(0.038) 
0.248 
(0.257) 
0.243 
(0.266) 
Hostile -0.039 
(0.021)* 
-0.040 
(0.021)* 
-0.038 
(0.038) 
-0.038 
(0.036) 
-0.117 
(0.189) 
-0.107 
(0.176) 
Poison 0.063 
(0.027)** 
0.064 
(0.027)** 
0.064 
(0.043) 
0.065 
(0.043) 
0.471 
(0.239)* 
0.462 
(0.239)* 
Tender -0.001 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.024) 
-0.001 
(0.025) 
-0.030 
(0.138) 
-0.032 
(0.138) 
Cleanup -0.030 
(0.022) 
-0.030 
(0.022) 
-0.012 
(0.030) 
-0.011 
(0.030) 
-0.110 
(0.149) 
-0.108 
(0.149) 
Acquirer 
rel. market 
value 
    -0.052 
(0.036) 
-0.052 
(0.036) 
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N 498 498 217 217 217 217 
R2 0.24 0.24 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.29 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in columns 1 through 4 is the excess return on the acquiring firm stock around the bid announcement. The dependent variable in columns 5 
and 6 is the acquiring firm excess return times the ratio of acquiring firm market value to target firm market value. The overall tax is the overall additional double tax as a 
share of income net of the target country corporate income tax. Withholding tax is the non-resident dividend withholding tax as a share. Parent tax is the acquirer country 
corporate tax as a share of income net of the target country corporate income tax. Market value is the log of the market value of the target in millions of U.S. dollars. Book-to-
market is the ratio of the book and market values of the target. Leverage is the ratio of the liabilities and assets of the target. Equity is dummy variable signaling an all equity 
transaction. Cash is a dummy variable signaling an all cash transaction. Hostile is a dummy variable signaling the offer is not supported by the board of the target. Poison is a 
dummy variable signaling the presence of a poison pill. Tender is a dummy variable signaling there is a tender offer for all shares. Cleanup is a dummy variable signaling the 
acquisition of a remaining interest with initial interest exceeding 50 percent. Acquirer relative market value is the ratio of acquirer firm market value to target firm market 
value. In columns 3-6 the sample is restricted to deals where the ratio of acquiring firm market value and target firm market value lies between 0.1 and 10. All regressions are 
estimated using OLS and include acquirer country, target country and year fixed effects. We report robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** 
significance at 5%, and *** significance at 1 percent. 
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Figure 1. The bid premium and the overall tax 
 
 
Notes: The bid premium is computed as a share. The overall tax is the additional tax due to 
non-resident dividend withholding taxation and acquirer country corporate income taxation 
computed as a share of the target’s income net of target country corporate income tax. 
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Figure 2. The bid premium and the withholding tax 
 
 
Notes: The bid premium is computed as a share. The withholding tax is the non-resident 
dividend withholding tax computed as a share. 
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Figure 3. The bid premium and the withholding tax after jittering observations 
 
 
Notes: The bid premium is computed as a share. The withholding tax is the non-resident 
dividend withholding tax computed as a share. Observations are jittered to better view the 
frequency of premium values for each of the four values of the withholding tax in the data set.
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Figure 4. The bid premium and the parent tax 
 
 
Notes: The bid premium is computed as a share. The parent tax is the acquirer country 
corporate income tax as a share of the target’s income net of target country corporate income 
tax.
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Appendix A. Variable definitions and date sources 
 
Variable Description Sources 
Premium Bid premium computed as ratio of bid price and the 
share price four weeks before announcement minus 
the ratio of the target country stock market index 
and the target country stock market index four 
weeks before the announcement 
Thomson SDC 
Overall tax The overall additional tax due to non-resident 
dividend withholding taxation and acquirer country 
corporate income taxation computed as a share of  
income of the target net of target country corporate 
income tax 
For corporate income tax rates: Chennells and Griffith (1997) Eurostat (2004), 
KPMG International Tax and Legal Center (2003). For tax regimes, tax treaties 
and withholding taxes: Coopers & Lybrand (1998), IBFD (2005a, 2005b, 
2005c, 2005d). Previous issues of these publications were consulted as well. 
Overall tax 
gross 
The overall additional double tax due to non-
resident dividend withholding taxation and acquirer 
country corporate income taxation computed as a 
share of the income of the target before the target 
country corporate income tax. 
As above 
Withholding 
tax 
Non-resident dividend withholding tax rate as a 
share 
As above 
Parent tax Double tax due to acquirer country corporate 
income taxation as a share of the income of the 
target net of target country corporate income tax 
As above 
Tax difference The absolute value of the difference of the tax rates 
of the acquirer and target countries where the latter 
is adjusted to take into account non-resident 
withholding taxation and acquirer country corporate 
income taxation of the income of the target 
As above 
Market value Log of market value of target four weaker prior to 
announcement in millions of U.S. dollars 
Thomson SDC 
Book-to-
market 
Book value of target divided by market value of 
target four weeks prior to announcement 
Compustat North America, Compustat Global, and Thomson SDC 
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Leverage Ratio of liabilities and assets of the target Compustat North America, and Compustat Global, and Thomson SDC 
Equity Dummy variable signaling an all equity transaction Thomson SDC 
Cash Dummy variable signaling an all cash transaction As above 
Hostile Dummy variable signaling an offer that is not 
supported by the board of the target 
As above 
Poison Dummy variable signaling the presence of a poison 
pill 
As above 
Tender Dummy variable signaling there is a tender offer for 
all shares  
As above 
Cleanup Dummy variable signaling the acquisition of a 
remaining interest with an initial interest exceeding 
50 percent. 
As above 
Acquirer firm 
excess return 
Acquirer firm stock market return between day after 
bid announcement and four weeks prior to bid 
announcement minus return on national stock 
market index over same period 
Datastream and Thomson SDC 
Acquirer firm 
relative market 
value 
Ratio of acquirer firm market value to target firm 
market value four weeks prior to bid announcement 
Datastream and Thomson SDC 
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